On January 16, 2025, a Ryanair flight en route to Vilnius, Lithuania, was diverted to Warsaw, Poland, due to GPS interference. Lithuania’s air navigation authority confirmed the disruption, which follows previous allegations from Estonia and Finland that Russia has engaged in electronic warfare (EW) tactics affecting GPS signals. This incident is part of a growing trend of GPS interference impacting aviation, particularly in regions near NATO borders. Reports indicate a significant increase in such disruptions in Northern and Eastern Europe, with Finland alone experiencing 2,800 incidents in 2024 compared to 200 in 2023.
What is GPS Interference?
GPS, short for Global Positioning System, is a network of satellites and receiving devices used for positioning, navigation, and timing on Earth in everything from ships and planes to cars. It has become one of the most important navigation tools in aviation, replacing expensive ground-based systems that traditionally guided aircraft toward landing.
However, GPS signals are vulnerable to interference, which can be caused by either jamming or spoofing. GPS jamming involves the use of a frequency-transmitting device to block or disrupt GPS signals by broadcasting stronger signals from the ground that overpower satellite transmissions. This can cause a complete loss of GPS functionality, forcing aircraft to rely on alternative navigation systems.
GPS spoofing, on the other hand, is more deceptive and often considered more dangerous. It involves transmitting false GPS signals that mislead a receiver into displaying incorrect location, altitude, or time data. This can cause navigational errors, potentially leading to aircraft being misdirected. A spoofing attack could, for example, be used to send a drone or enemy aircraft off course by feeding it incorrect coordinates. For commercial aviation, the main risk arises when a passenger aircraft’s GPS receiver unknowingly picks up a spoofed signal, confusing both the pilots and air traffic control by displaying incorrect location or time data.
GPS Interference as an Aviation Security Threat
GPS interference disrupts satellite-based navigation, forcing aircraft to rely on alternative methods such as ground-based systems or inertial navigation. Flight diversions become necessary when pilots lose reliable GPS data, leading to increased fuel consumption, delays, and operational disruptions. For example, the Ryanair flight to Vilnius had to divert to Warsaw, traveling an additional 400 km, significantly impacting passengers and scheduling. A similar case occurred when a Ryanair flight from Riga to Vienna was forced to land in Brno, Czech Republic, due to reported GPS signal disruptions combined with poor visibility.
Loss of GPS data also increases the risk of mid-air collisions, as it can disrupt aircraft separation and air traffic management, particularly in congested airspace. In 2024, multiple aircraft reported GPS interference over Finland, prompting emergency use of ground-based navigation. Emergency responses are similarly compromised when GPS-dependent tracking systems fail, as demonstrated by a helicopter crash in Greater São Paulo linked to GPS signal loss (16 Jan 2025), which affected rescue operations.
Additionally, GPS interference has emerged as a potential hybrid warfare tactic. Repeated disruptions in NATO-aligned states suggest a geopolitical motive, where hostile state actors use electronic warfare capabilities to destabilize civil aviation. Finland’s Traficom agency reported a sharp increase in GPS interference incidents, attributing them primarily to Russian activities.
Attribution and Geopolitical Context
Lithuania, Finland, and Estonia have repeatedly accused Russia of GPS interference operations, which Moscow has denied. However, historical patterns indicate that disruptions frequently coincide with heightened military activity, particularly Russian operations in Ukraine and NATO exercises in the Baltic region. Russia possesses advanced electronic warfare capabilities that can interfere with satellite signals over vast areas. Reports indicate that GPS interference was extensively used by Russia during military operations in Ukraine, causing significant disruptions to both military and civilian navigation.
NATO and European aviation authorities have been closely monitoring these incidents, urging airlines to adopt alternative navigation solutions and enhance resilience against electronic threats. Estonia and Finland have previously highlighted GPS signal disruptions affecting military and civilian flights, reinforcing the need for coordinated international responses to mitigate the risks associated with GPS interference.
Mitigation Strategies
Given the rising frequency of GPS interference, aviation authorities and airlines have been implementing various mitigation strategies. One of the key approaches is the increased reliance on alternative navigation systems such as Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) and ground-based navigation aids like VOR/DME (VHF Omnidirectional Range/Distance Measuring Equipment). Finland has responded to the threat by introducing radar-based landing systems at 14 airports to counter GPS interference.
Training programs for pilots are also being enhanced to ensure they are well-prepared to operate in GPS-denied environments. Airlines across Europe have started implementing procedures to handle scenarios involving GPS signal disruptions, ensuring flight crews can transition smoothly to backup navigation methods when necessary.
Technological advancements are being pursued to counteract the effects of GPS interference. Efforts include the development of anti-jamming technologies such as GPS signal authentication and backup satellite navigation systems like Europe’s Galileo, which is less susceptible to interference. Some airlines have already begun testing alternative navigation technologies designed to resist disruptions.
On a broader scale, international cooperation is being strengthened to address the threat of GPS interference. Intelligence-sharing mechanisms among NATO and EU aviation bodies are being expanded to facilitate real-time monitoring and rapid response to signal disruptions. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has taken an active role in assessing GPS interference risks and formulating mitigation strategies.
Conclusion
The Ryanair incident serves as a stark reminder of the growing threat that GPS interference poses to civil aviation, particularly in regions adjacent to geopolitical conflict zones. These disruptions not only present immediate operational and safety risks but also carry broader strategic implications. To effectively mitigate this evolving security challenge, airlines and aviation authorities must remain vigilant, continuously monitor disruptions, invest in resilient navigation technologies, and strengthen international cooperation. Only through a coordinated and proactive approach can flight safety be maintained in an era where electronic warfare is increasingly impacting civilian air travel.